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Abstract
Studies in political science and psychology suggest that voterspercep-
tions of political positions depend on their personal views of the candidates.
A voter who likes/dislikes a candidate will perceive his position as closer
to/further from his own than it really is (projection). Clearly these e¤ects
should be most pronounced when candidate positions are ambiguous. Thus
a generally well liked candidate will have an incentive to take an ambiguous
position. In this paper we construct a simple model to see under which
conditions this incentive survives in the strategic setting of electoral compe-
tition, even if voters dislike ambiguity per se.
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21 Introduction
Ambiguous statements are prevalent in electoral competition. Assuming politi-
cians are rational that implies that at least some politicians have incentives to be
ambiguous and that these incentives survive in the strategic setting of an election.
The question then is where these incentives come from. In this paper we formulate
a model that enables us to examine one possible answer to that question. The
model is a standard Downsian model extended by the possibility of taking am-
biguous positions and some behavioral assumptions on voter perception. In the
following we will give a non-formal introduction to the model and its background.
We take the view that ambiguous policy positions should not be modelled by
objective probability distributions on the policy space. This is in line with Page
(1976) where it is argued that ambiguous candidates do not express their stands in
a way that is properly characterized in terms of probability distributions/lotteries.
Instead they give vaguely conicting hints about their stands and only precise
statements about what they do not stand for or they do not give any impression
of their positions at all (p. 744-5). We claim that these observations support
modelling ambiguous strategies as subsets of the policy space which will be the
approach in this paper.
When ambiguous positions are represented by sets instead of probability distri-
butions it is not obvious how to model the votersevaluation of positions because
the application of expected utility is not straightforward. For the voters to use
expected utility they need to somehow associate probability distributions with the
ambiguous strategies they have to rank in order to decide which candidate to vote
for. This approach allows for subjectivity in voter perception which is a central
aspect of our model.
Thus we need a theory for how the perception of each voter is formed, i.e. how
a probability distribution is associated with a subset of policies representing an
ambiguous position. For that we get inspiration from psychology, more specically
from Balance Theory which is a theory claiming that the attitudes and beliefs of
a person (voter) will be formed or changed to achieve "cognitive balance" (see
Granberg (1993), p. 75-83). Suppose we consider a person (voter) P who has
attitudes towards another person (political candidate) O and an issue X (e.g.
more or less redistribution) and a belief about Os attitude towards X. These are
denoted P-O, P-X and O-X. Then there is cognitive balance if P agrees with and
likes O or disagrees with and dislikes O. For example, if P likes O, favors more
redistribution and believes that O has the same opinion, then there is cognitive
balance and the set of attitudes and belief is stable. But if P likes O, favors more
redistribution and thinks that O favors less redistribution then there is cognitive
imbalance and the theory predicts that either P-O, P-X or X-O will change. These
two situations can be illustrated by the following diagrams.
3A balanced and an imbalanced set of attitudes and beliefs.
Here we will assume that before the campaign voters have formed non-policy
related attitudes towards the candidates (P-O) and that they have preferences
over the policy space (P-X). We also assume that these will not change during
the campaign. Then, by Balance Theory, each voters perception of the positions
of the candidates (O-X) should depend on his attitudes towards the candidates
and his policy preferences. Roughly speaking a voter will, in his mind, "pull"
a well liked candidate towards his own preferred position and "push" a disliked
candidate away from that position. This phenomenon is called projection or, if
we want to distinguish between pulling and pushing, assimilation and contrast.
Originally these terms come from Social Judgment Theory, but the idea that pro-
jection of some communicated message depends on the receivers attitude towards
the communicator comes from Balance Theory (see Granberg (1993), p. 83-88).
Granberg (1993) cites a lot of empirical studies on projection e¤ects in elections.
Generally they support Balance Theory in the sense that voters attitudes and
beliefs are balanced although it seems to be more important to agree with a favored
candidate than to disagree with a non-favored candidate. But it is hard empirically
to identify how balance is achieved. Is balance reached by projection (adjusting
O-X), rational selection (adjusting P-O) or persuation (adjusting P-X)? According
to Granberg there is not yet a satisfactory empirical answer to that question, but
some work on separating projection from rational selection and persuation suggest
that projection is really happening (and so is some combination of rational selection
and persuation).
A more recent empirical study is Merrill, Grofman & Adams (2001) where data
from elections in Norway, France and the US are used. They also nd results that
can be interpreted as assimilation and contrast e¤ects. There seems to be more
assimilation than contrast. However they show that rational selection (choosing
the closest candidate) together with random variation in votersplacement of can-
4didates and/or variable voter perception of the scale can generate e¤ects that look
like assimilation. Thus there may not really be less contrast than assimilation,
since part of what looks like assimilation could be rational selection (together
with random variation/scale perception e¤ects). And in some cases (US elections)
there might even be more contrast than assimilation. But, even taking the rational
selection caveat into consideration, "...some real assimilation is still likely to be
present." (footnote 8, p. 219).
If there were no limits to projection then the positions of the candidates would
become irrelevant and only non-policy related attitudes would matter for the out-
come of an election. Therefore we assume that there can be no "counter factual"
projection in the following sense. A certain position (a single point in the policy
space) is perceived correctly by all voters. And each voter will associate an ambigu-
ous position with some probability distribution that does not put any probability
mass on policies outside the subset given by the position. In that way we ensure
that voting is still policy dependent to a large extend. But projection does matter
if at least one of the candidates chooses to be ambiguous. This approach to ex-
plaining political ambiguity is briey considered in the following quote from Page
(1976): "A di¤erent theoretical approach might recognize that perceptions vary,
and seek incentives for ambiguity in the fact that it permits citizens to project or
selectively perceive that candidates stand for whatever they want them to." (p.
748, footnote 38). Also, Social Judgment Theory claims that ambiguous messages
leaves more room for projection (Granberg (1993), p. 83-84).
We will use our formal model to analyze under which conditions projection
can in fact lead to ambiguity in electoral competition, even when voters are risk
averse. We will save the conclusions for later, but it should already now be clear
that when voters are risk averse only a generally well liked candidate can have an
incentive to be ambiguous.
A number of theoretical models on ambiguity in electoral competition exist
in the literature. The seminal paper is Shepsle (1972). He extends the standard
Downsian model by forcing one of the candidates (the challenger) to take a lottery
position. The voters are expected utility maximizers. The main result is that if a
majority of voters are risk loving on an interval containing the median, then the
challenger can beat an incumbent at the median by taking a lottery position with
mean equal to the median. However both existence and non-existence of a winning
(lottery) position for the challenger can occur.
Page (1976) is critical of Shepsles theory of ambiguity. He notes that the
prediction of ambiguity is not very strong because the challenger may not have
a winning strategy. Also he questions whether (a majority of) voters are really
risk loving. And, as mentioned earlier, he argues that lottery positions are not
a good way of modelling ambiguous political positions because candidates do not
express their positions in ways that can easily be perceived as objective probability
5distributions.
Page also presents his own theory of political ambiguity, emphasis allocation
theory. He considers a multidimensional space of policy and valence dimensions.
Candidates choose which dimensions (issues) to emphasize and choose positions in
these dimensions. They are vague/ambiguous on issues they do not put any em-
phasis on. Voters evaluate a candidate by summing the utilities of the candidates
positions on the issues, weigthed by the candidates emphasis on each issue. In an
example it is shown that this leads to emphasis on consensus issues and ambiguity
on issues of conict, no matter what the risk preferences of the voters are.
Later models of ambiguity include McKelvey (1980), Glazer (1990), Alesina and
Cukierman (1990), Aragones and Neeman (2000), Aragones and Postlewaite (2002)
and Meirowitz (2005). Among the explanations of ambiguity are uncertainty about
candidate and median voter preferences (Glazer (1990)) and su¢ ciently strong
candidate preference for exibility in o¢ ce (Aragones and Neeman (2000)). None
of the explanations o¤ered are similar to the one we suggest in this paper.
2 The Model
Our starting point is a standard one-dimensional spatial model with two candi-
dates. As mentioned above we will add to that model the possibility for candidates
to announce ambiguous policy positions and introduce projection e¤ects in the
votersperceptions of such positions. In the following we describe the model in
details.
2.1 The Candidates
Before the election the two candidates announce policy positions. Each candidate
can announce either a certain position or an ambiguous position. A certain position
is simply represented by a point in the policy space R. An ambiguous position
is represented by a compact interval of non-zero length. We will assume that
the maximum length of an interval representing an ambiguous position is 2 (an
innocent normalization). Thus the strategy space for both candidates can be
written as
S = f[A  a;A+ a] j A 2 R; 0  a  1g: (1)
Announced positions are credible in the sense that the candidate who wins the
election must enact a policy in his announced interval.
The candidates care only about winning or loosing, they have no policy pref-
erences. Thus their preference relation over the outcome of the election is given
6by
win  draw  loose: (2)
The outcome of the election is, of course, decided by how the voters evaluate
the policy positions of the candidates. That will be described in the following
subsection. All the information about the voters is known by the candidates.
2.2 The Voters
There is a continuum of voters and each of them has a preferred point in the policy
space R. The distribution of their preferred points is given by a density function
v : R ! R. We make the rather innocent assumptions that v is continuous and
that the support of v is an interval. Without loss of generality we assume that the
median voter is located at x0 = 0. Thus we haveZ 0
 1
v(x)dx =
Z 1
0
v(x)dx =
1
2
: (3)
Each voter has a utility function over policies. Let the utility function of the
median voter be u0 : R ! R. Then the utility function ux0 of a voter with
preferred point at x0 2 R is dened by
ux0(x) = u0(x  x0) for all x 2 R: (4)
We assume that u0 is symmetric around 0 and C2 with
u00(x) 7 0 for all x ? 0;
u000(x) < 0 for all x 2 R: (5)
Thus all voters are strictly risk averse.
We are now ready to describe how voters decide on which candidate to vote
for. If both candidates announce a certain position then each voter simply votes
for the candidate announcing the position that gives the highest utility. If at least
one of the candidates announces an ambiguous position then it is less obvious
how the voter should decide on who to cast his vote for. We would like voters
to use expected utility, but that is not straightforward since an ambiguous posi-
tion is represented by an interval of policies rather than a probability distribution
over policies. Thus, for a voter to use expected utility to evaluate an ambiguous
position he has to somehow associate a probability distribution with the interval
representing the position. The distribution represents the voters perception of the
ambiguous position. Or, to put it di¤erently, the voters belief about which policy
7the candidate will enact if elected. How voters perceive ambiguous positions is the
central part of our model and we will use the rest of this section to describe it.
As described in the introduction, the main idea is that a voters perception of an
ambiguous position depends on whether he has a positive or negative (non-policy
related) attitude towards the candidate announcing it and where his preferred
policy is placed relative to the interval representing the position. If the voter likes
the candidate then he will put most of the probability mass on the points in the
interval that are closest to his preferred policy (assimilation). And if the voter
dislikes the candidate then he will do the opposite (contrast). We will make the
assumption that all voters have a positive attitude towards candidate 1 and a non-
positive (i.e. neutral or negative) attitude towards candidate 2. It is clearly not
realistic that all voters have identical attitudes towards the candidates, but it is
the obvious starting point and an interesting benchmark case.
Now we are ready to describe our model of voter perception in details. First
consider a voter with preferred point x0  1 and suppose that candidate 1 an-
nounces the ambiguous position [ 1; 1] (thus we are modelling assimilation from
the right in a case with maximal ambiguity around the median). Then the proba-
bility distribution that the voter associates with the ambiguous position is given by
some density function f : [ 1; 1]! R that is weakly increasing and non-constant,
i.e.
x  y ) f(x)  f(y) and f( 1) < f(1): (6)
We will also assume that f is continuous at the end points  1 and 1. This implies
that the cumulative distribution function F strictly rst order stochastically dom-
inates that of the uniform distribution on [ 1; 1]. That is our mathematical way
of saying that the voter is assimilating [ 1; 1] from the right.
An example of the density function f .
8Next, consider the case where, for some 0 < a < 1, the voter has preferred
point x0  a and the candidate chooses the ambiguous position [ a; a]. Then a
simple way to model the assimilation is to assume that the voters perception is
given by the density function fa : [ a; a]! R dened by
fa(x) =
1
a
f(
x
a
) for all x 2 [ a; a]: (7)
By modelling assimilation of [ a; a] this way we assume that, loosely speaking,
the strength of the assimilation e¤ect does not decrease with the level of ambigu-
ity. That will be made more precise later on (section 4) where we will present a
more general way of modelling assimilation for a < 1 that allows for decreasing
assimilation. But for now we will stick to the simple model so that we do not bury
the idea of the paper in technical details.
Until now we have only considered ambiguity around the median. Suppose that
candidate 1 announces an interval [A  a;A+ a] with A 6= 0. The perception of a
voter with x0  A+ a will then be represented by the translated density function
fa;A : [A  a;A+ a]! R dened by
fa;A(x) = fa(x  A) for all x 2 [ a+ A; a+ A]: (8)
Thus we have modelled assimilation of any ambiguous position by voters to
the right of this position. The modelling of assimilation for voters to the left of
an ambiguous position follows by symmetry (reect the density function in the
midpoint of the interval).
Suppose now that candidate 2 announces an ambiguous position. Then the
perceptions of the voters having a negative attitude towards him will display a
contrast e¤ect. Having modelled assimilation for voters outside the interval, it is
easy to model contrast for these voters. We simply dene the contrast perception
of a voter to the right of the interval as the assimilation perception of a voter
to the left of the interval and vice versa. The perceptions of the voters having
a neutral attitude towards the candidate are given by the uniform distribution
on the interval. So neutral voters all have the same (unbiased) perception of the
ambiguous strategy.
It is di¢ cult, for a general f , to make a tractable model of assimilation and
contrast for voters with preferred points in the interior of an ambiguous position.
So we will leave the modelling of the perceptions of "interior voters" to a special
case where f has a very simple functional form. That special case will be treated
in detail in the next section.
93 Results
In this section we will answer two questions. The rst one is whether candidate 1
can, by being ambiguous, win the election when candidate 2 announces the median.
The second question is whether candidate 1 has a winning strategy, i.e. whether he
can announce an ambiguous position such that he wins no matter what candidate
2 does.
The rst question we can answer without imposing any additional assumptions.
To answer the second question we need to model the perceptions of interior voters,
so we will only consider a special case of the model where this can be done in a
fairly straightforward way.
3.1 Candidate 2 announces the median
In the standard model, a candidate announcing the median will always get at least
a draw. Therefore it is interesting to see whether that is also the case in our model.
It is obvious that candidate 1 will always get at least a draw by positioning himself
at the median. But because of the assimilation e¤ect that may not be the case
for candidate 2. In fact the following result shows that it is not - candidate 1 can
"beat the median" by being ambiguous. Considering that voters are locally risk
neutral the result is actually not that surprising.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose candidate 2 announces the median. Then there exists some
a0 > 0 such that, for any 0 < a  a0, candidate 1 wins the election by announcing
[ a; a] .
The theorem is a special case of theorem 4.1. Note that it follows immedi-
ately from the theorem that in the sequential game where candidate 2 moves rst,
candidate 1 can always win the election.
3.2 A winning strategy for candidate 1?
As mentioned above we will only consider a special case of the model. Let f have
the following simple form
f(x) =
8<:
1 
2
if x 2 [ 1; 0)
1+
2
if x 2 [0; 1];
(9)
where 0 <   1 is a parameter. Obviously f is weakly increasing, non-constant
and continuous at the end points.
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The special form of f .
As described earlier specifying f denes assimilation (and contrast) of any
ambiguous strategy for "exterior voters", i.e. voters with preferred points outside
the interval. For example, if candidate 1 announces [ a; a] then the perception of
a voter with x0  a is given by
fa(x) =
8<:
1 
2a
if x 2 [ a; 0)
1+
2a
if x 2 [0; a]:
(10)
With this simple type of projection for exterior voters there is a fairly straight-
forward way to extend it to interior voters. Suppose candidate 1 announces [ 1; 1].
Then the perception of a voter with  1 < x0 < 1 is given by the density function
fx0 dened by
fx0(x) = f(x) if x0 2 (1
2
; 1);
fx0(x) =
8<:
1 
2
if x =2 [x0   12 ; x0 + 12 ]
1+
2
if x 2 [x0   12 ; x0 + 12 ]
9=; if x0 2 [ 12 ; 12] and
fx0(x) = f( x) if x0 2 ( 1; 1
2
): (11)
11
fx0 for an x0 2 (0; 12).
This is infact all we need to model assimilation (and contrast) for interior voters,
the extension to all intervals is obvious. For example, if candidate 1 announces
[ a; a] then the perception of a voter with  a
2
 x0  a2 is given by
fx0a (x) =
8<:
1 
2a
if x =2 [x0   a2 ; x0 + a2 ]
1+
2a
if x 2 [x0   a2 ; x0 + a2 ]:
(12)
The nal assumption of this special case is that voter utility is quadratic, i.e. that
u0(x) =  x2.
This special case enables us to answer the question of whether candidate 1 has
a winning strategy or not, i.e. if he can announce a position (which obviously must
be ambiguous) such that he will win the election no matter what candidate 2 does.
It turns out that the answer depends on . There exists a  2 (0; 1) such that
for    the answer is negative and for  >  the answer is positive.
Theorem 3.2 Consider the special case of the model described above and let  =
1
2
(
q
19
3
  1) ( 0:758). Then the following two statements hold.
1. Suppose   . Then candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy. More
specically, if candidate 1 announces the ambiguous position [A   a;A + a]
then candidate 2 can either win (if  < ) or get at least a draw (if  = )
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by announcing the certain position x given by
x =
8<:
A+ a
2
if A  0
A  a
2
if A > 0:
(13)
(And if candidate 1 announces a certain position then candidate 2 can win
or get a draw by announcing the median.)
2. Suppose  > . Then there exists an a0 > 0 such that, for any 0 < a  a0,
[ a; a] is a winning strategy for candidate 1.
The theorem is a special case of theorem 4.2. Note that it follows from the
two theorems in this section that if    then the simultaneous move game
has no Nash equilibrium. Because given any strategy of candidate 2, candidate
1 can win and given any strategy of candidate 1, candidate 2 can get at least a
draw. Also note that from theorem 3.2 it follows that if  <  then any pair of
announcements where candidate 1 announces [ a; a] for some 0 < a  a0 is a Nash
equilibrium (because the candidates do not care about their share of votes, only
whether they win, draw or loose).
4 Extensions of the Model
In this section we will generalize our model of projection such that it allows for
decreasing assimilation as the level of ambiguity decreases (in a sense that will be
dened below). And then we will see how that a¤ects our results from the previous
section.
Let (fa)a2(0;1] be a family of functions such that each fa is a density function
on [ a; a]: Assume that each fa is weakly increasing, non-constant and continuous
at the end points. Then the fas dene assimilation and contrast of all ambiguous
positions for exterior voters (as described in section 2). For 0 < a  1 dene
Ea =
E(fa)
aE(f1)
: (14)
Ea is a rst order measure of the strength of the assimilation e¤ect. If Ea < 1
then the assimilation is weaker for a than for the maximal level of ambiguity in
the sense that the mean of the perception has decreased proportionally faster than
the level of ambiguity. We will assume that Ea weakly decreases as a decreases
(so that assimilation does not increase as the level of ambiguity decreases).
It is important how strong the assimilation e¤ect is as a! 0. Therefore dene
E0 = lim
a!0
Ea: (15)
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If E0 = 0 then the rst order assimilation e¤ect disappears as a ! 0. Otherwise
it survives to some extend as the level of ambiguity goes to zero. Note that for
the model used in the previous sections (fa(x) = 1af(
x
a
)) we have Ea = 1 for all
0 < a  1 and therefore E0 = 1. Thus it represents a case where the rst order
assimilation e¤ect does not decrease at all as the level of ambiguity decreases.
While that does make things nice and simple it is not an obviously true or innocent
assumption. So it makes sense to do a robustness check by using the more general
model.
The following result is a generalized version of theorem 3.1. The proof is left
to the appendix.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose E0 > 0 and that candidate 2 announces the median. Then
there exists an a0 > 0 such that, for any 0 < a  a0, candidate 1 wins the election
by announcing [ a; a] .
So as long as some of the rst order assimilation e¤ect is preserved as the level
of ambiguity goes to zero, candidate 1 can "beat the median".
The general model of assimilation presented above is too general for us to
answer the question of whether candidate 1 has a winning strategy. But we can
generalize the result in theorem 3.2 to a situation where assimilation decreases with
the level of ambiguity. Given some f we can get a model allowing for decreasing
assimilation by dening
fa(x) = h(a)
1
a
f(
x
a
) + (1  h(a)) 1
2a
; (16)
where h : (0; 1] ! [0; 1] is continuous, weakly increasing and satises h(1) = 1.
If we let h(a) = 1 for all a 2 (0; 1] then we get the simple model. If h is strictly
increasing then we have decreasing assimilation as the level of ambiguity decreases.
Because by noting that
E(fa) =
Z a
 a
x(h(a)
1
a
f(
x
a
) + (1  h(a)) 1
2a
)dx = h(a)E(fa) = h(a)aE(f) (17)
we see that
Ea = h(a) for all 0 < a  1 (18)
and
E0 = lim
a!0
h(a): (19)
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If f is the piecewise constant function considered in section 3.2 then we have that,
for all 0 < a  1;
fa(x) =
8<:
h(a)1 
2a
+ (1  h(a)) 1
2a
if x 2 [ a; 0)
h(a)1+
2a
+ (1  h(a)) 1
2a
if x 2 [0; a]
=
8<:
1 h(a)
2a
if x 2 [ a; 0)
1+h(a)
2a
if x 2 [0; a]:
(20)
The denition of the density functions representing the perceptions of interior
voters is then straightforward. With this more general model of projection for
a < 1 we have the following generalized version of theorem 3.2. Note that we
still assume that votersutility functions are quadratic. The proof is left to the
appendix.
Theorem 4.2 Consider the special case of the model described above and let  =
1
2
(
q
19
3
  1). Then the following two statements hold.
1. Suppose   . Then candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy. More
specically, if candidate 1 announces the ambiguous position [A   a;A + a]
then candidate 2 can either win (if  < ) or get at least a draw (if  = )
by announcing the certain position x given by
x =
8<:
A+ ah(a)
2
if A  0
A  ah(a)
2
if A > 0:
(21)
(And if candidate 1 announces a certain position then candidate 2 can win
or get a draw by announcing the median.)
2. Suppose E0 > . Then there exists an a0 > 0 such that, for any 0 < a  a0,
[ a; a] is a winning strategy for candidate 1.
The remaining question is what happens when  <   maxf 
E0
; 1g. In
that parameter interval there is no general result, whether winning strategies for
candidate 1 exist or not depends on the function h.
5 Discussion
We have extended the standard Downsian model of electoral competition by al-
lowing ambiguous candidate positions and projection e¤ects in votersperceptions
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of such positions. The model was constructed to help us answer the question of
whether projection (assimilation) can make a generally well liked candidate take
an ambiguous position, even when voters dislike ambiguity per se. To put things
on the edge we assumed that all voters like candidate 1 and that no voters like
candidate 2.
We have seen that announcing the median does not guarantee candidate 2 a
draw because candidate 1 can "beat the median" by being ambiguous. That result
is quite robust. We have also seen that ambiguity can be a winning strategy for
candidate 1. But that result relies on a strong assimilation e¤ect. If the assim-
ilation e¤ect is not su¢ ciently strong then candidate 2 can beat any ambiguous
position of candidate 1. This is a quite interesting result because it shows that
even a substantial advantage due to assimilation is not enough to ensure candidate
1 the victory.
So assimilation by itself is not necessarily enough to explain ambiguity in elec-
toral competition. But even when it is not it could still be an important contribut-
ing factor. For example if it is combined with the assumption that candidates have
a preference for exibility in o¢ ce (see for example Aragones and Neeman (2000)).
If assimilation is a signicant part of the explanation of ambiguity in electoral
competition we would expect to see candidates that are generally well liked on
a personal level to be more ambiguous than candidates that are not. It would
be interesting to see some empirical or experimental work on that (although we
recognize that there are lots of problems in doing such work). It would also be
interesting to see some empirical or experimental work on the relationship between
ambiguity and assimilation/contrast.
There are also possibilities for further theoretical research. As mentioned above
one possibility is to include candidate preferences for exibility in o¢ ce into the
model. That may give stronger predictions of ambiguity. Other possibilities are to
look at candidates with policy preferences or candidates that are uncertain about
the distribution of the voterspreferred points.
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7 Appendix
Here we present proofs of the theorems in section 4.
Proof of theorem 4.1.
For each 0 < a  b  1 dene
Bb = fx0 2 R n f0g j j
u00x0(0)
u0x0(0)
j < 2E(f1)
b
E0g (22)
and
Bmaxb;a = fx0 2 R n [  a; a] j max aya u
00
x0
(y) <
2E(f1)
b
E0ju0x0(0)jg: (23)
Then the theorem follows from the following three claims.
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 Claim 1: Suppose E0 > 0. Then there exists a b0 > 0 such that a strict
majority of voters have preferred points in Bb0.
 Claim 2: Suppose there exists a b0 > 0 such that a strict majority of voters
have preferred points in Bb0. Then there exists an 0 < a0  b0 such that a
strict majority of voters have preferred points in Bmaxb0;a for any 0 < a  a0.
 Claim 3: Suppose there exist 0 < a0 < b0 such that a strict majority of
voters have preferred points in Bmaxb0;a for any 0 < a  a0: Also suppose that
candidate 1 announces [ a; a] for some 0 < a  a0 and candidate 2 announces
0 (the median). Then any voter with a preferred point in Bmaxb0;a will vote for
candidate 1.
Proof of claim 1: ju00x0 (0)
u0x0 (0)
j = ju000 ( x0)
u00( x0) j is a continuous function (of x0) on Rnf0g.
Therefore it is bounded on compact subsets of Rnf0g: And thus it follows that for
any n 2 N there exists a b > 0 such that
fx0 2 R j 1
n
 jx0j  ng  Bb: (24)
Since there exists an N such that a strict majority has preferred points in fx0 2
R j 1
N
 jx0j  Ng the claim follows immediately.
Proof of claim 2: For any (Lebesgue measurable) B  R let v(B) denote the
share of voters with preferred points in B. Using the continuity of u00 it is easily
seen that [
0<ab0
Bmaxb0;a = Bb0 : (25)
So we have
v(
[
0<ab0
Bmaxb0;a ) = v(Bb0) >
1
2
: (26)
From the fact that a1  a2 ) Bmaxb0;a2  Bmaxb0;a1 it follows that
v(Bmaxb0;a )! v(
[
0<ab0
Bmaxb0;a ) for a! 0: (27)
Thus we must have v(Bmaxb0;a ) >
1
2
for a su¢ ciently close to zero.
Proof of claim 3: Let 0 < a  a0 and consider a voter with preferred point
x0 2 Bmaxb0;a . If the voter votes for candidate 1, then so does a voter with preferred
point  x0. Therefore it su¢ ces to look at the case x0 > 0. The voters perceived
expected utility of the position of candidate 1 isZ a
 a
ux0(x)fa(x)dx: (28)
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Thus we have to show thatZ a
 a
ux0(x)fa(x)dx > ux0(0): (29)
By Taylors Theorem we get that for all x 2 R there exists a  between 0 and x
such that
ux0(x) = ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)x+
u00x0()
2
x2: (30)
By the denition of Bmaxb0;a it then follows that for all x 2 [ a; a],
ux0(x)  ux0(0) + u0x0(0)x  u0x0(0)
E(f1)
b0
E0x
2: (31)
Using that inequality we getZ a
 a
ux0(x)fa(x)dx

Z a
 a
(ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)x  u0x0(0)
E(f1)
b0
E0x
2)fa(x)dx
= ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)(
Z a
 a
xfa(x)dx  E(f1)
b0
E0
Z a
 a
x2fa(x)dx)
> ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)(
Z a
 a
xfa(x)dx  E(f1)
b0
E0a
2)
 ux0(0) + u0x0(0)(E(fa)  E(f1)E0a)
= ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)E(f1)a(Ea   E0)
 ux0(0): (32)
2
Proof of theorem 4.2.
1: We will only do the proof for A = 0. The extension to A 6= 0 is straightfor-
ward.
First let  < , 0 < a  1 and x = ah(a)
2
. Candidate 2 wins the election if,
for some " > 0,
Ux0([ a; a]) < ux0(x) for all x0 >  "; (33)
where Ux0([ a; a]) denotes the perceived expected utility of [ a; a] (announced by
candidate 1) for a voter with preferred point x0.
First consider voters with x0  a2 . Since E(fa) = ah(a)2 = x and voters are
risk averse these voters will all vote for candidate 2.
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Then consider voters with  a
2
< x0 <
a
2
. In this case we have
Ux0([ a; a]) =
1  h(a)
2a
Z x0 a2
 a
 (x  x0)2dx
+
1 + h(a)
2a
Z x0+a2
x0 a2
 (x  x0)2dx
+
1  h(a)
2a
Z a
x0+
a
2
 (x  x0)2dx
= (1  h(a))x20   a2(
1
3
  h(a)
4
): (34)
The expression for ux0(x
) is
ux0(x
) =  (ah(a)
2
  x0)2 =  x20 + ah(a)x0  
2a2h(a)2
4
: (35)
Thus we just have to check whether there exists an " > 0 such that, for all
 " < x0 < a2 ,
h(a)x20   ah(a)x0 + a2(
2h(a)2
4
+
h(a)
4
  1
3
) < 0: (36)
The inequality holds for all x0 between the roots of the polynomial on the left
hand side. These are
x0 =
a
2
 a
2
s
4
3h(a)
  h(a): (37)
So we just have to show that 4
3h(a)
  h(a) > 1. That is easily checked.
Then let  = . It follows easily from what we did above that in this case
Ux0([ a; a]) < ux0(x) for all x0 > 0: (38)
Thus, if candidate 1 announces [ a; a], then candidate 2 can always get a draw by
announcing x.
2: Let E0 >  and dene  by
 =

4(E0  
q
4 3E0
3
)
: (39)
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Note that since E0 > ,  is well-dened and positive. Then pick an a0 > 0 such
that there are strictly less than 50% of voters in the interval [ a0; a0], i.e. such
that Z a0
 a0
v(x)dx <
1
2
: (40)
We will show that this a0 "does the job". So let 0 < a  a0 and x 2 R and assume
that candidate 1 announces [ a; a] and candidate 2 announces x. We have to
show that a strict majority of voters will vote for candidate 1. We will only do it
for x  0. The proof for x < 0 is completely analogous.
First consider the case x > a
2
q
4 3h(a)
3
. It is easily seen that
ux0(x
) =  x20 + 2xx0   x2 (41)
and
Ux0([ a; a]) =
8<:
 x20   ah(a)x0   a
2
3
if x0   a2
 (1  h(a))x20   a2(13   h(a)4 ) if   a2 < x0 < a2 :
(42)
Using these expressions it is straightforward to check that
Ux0([ a; a]) > ux0(x) for all x0  0: (43)
Since both sides of the inequality are continuous in x0 the inequality also holds
for positive values of x0 su¢ ciently close to 0. Thus a strict majority will vote for
candidate 1.
Finally consider the remaining case, i.e. 0  x  a
2
q
4 3h(a)
3
. We claim that
for these x,
f x0 2 R j Ux0([ a; a])  ux0(x) g  [ a0; a0] ; (44)
which means that a strict majority of voters will vote for candidate 1. Thus we
have to show that
jx0j > a0 ) Ux0([ a; a]) > ux0(x): (45)
Since x  0 it su¢ ces to show that
x0 > a
0 ) Ux0([ a; a]) > ux0(x): (46)
And since a0 > a > a
2
> a
2
h(a) > a
2
q
4 3h(a)
3
that holds true if
x0 > a
0 )
Z a
 a
 (x  x0)2fa(x)dx > ux0(
a
2
r
4  3h(a)
3
); (47)
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i.e. if, for all x0 > a0;
 x20 + ah(a)x0  
a2
3
>  x20 + a
r
4  3h(a)
3
x0   a
2
4
(
4  3h(a)
3
): (48)
By straightforward calculations we see that the inequality above is satised for all
x0 > a
h(a)
4(h(a) 
q
4 3h(a)
3
)
: (49)
Since h(a)  E0 it follows that
  h(a)
4(h(a) 
q
4 3h(a)
3
)
(50)
and thus we are done. 2
